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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH

In the Matter of the Estate
Case No.
of
CHLOE RYAN CALL,

986)

Deceased.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The testatrix, Chloe R. Call, made and
executed her

~ill

at Provo, Utah, Jctober

29, 1953, and she died April 21, 1957, at
Provo, Utah, leaving surviving her two child
ren, bessie Call Nielson, daughter, and Orv1
~.

Call, son, and two nephews, Don Lewis Hya

and William K. Ryan, and a niece Phyllis F.
Ryan Hastings.

That her son Orvis

w.

Call

was a building contractor who had begun
building homes on part of the real property
while testatrix was still living on the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

--'~

property.

(Tr. 25, '2-)4, -1-42).

That on

Maroh 28, 1957, and on April 2, 1951, teatatr1x d1Yided and deeded all of her propert7
oons1at1Dg or a Yery old hoae and

un1~roYed

buil41ng lota to the two oh114ren by separate deeda (Exh1b1ta 1 aDd 2) after testatrix
entered the hospital on her laat illneaa
(Tr. 4)).

~at

without the knowledge

or

t .. tatrix while she was still in the hospital

oa her deathbed, the children on April 10,

1957, deeded by two deeds (Exhibits J and 4)
back to their aother the said property of
aald estate for obYious tax adYantagea.
(B. 22, 88, 89, 90, 91, Tr. J?-)8).
That on JulJ 22, 1960, the aon Or.1a

w.

Call died aa a result of a truck accident
(Tr. 12) after aale from aaid estate of certain building lota (Tr. 29, Bs )2, J9, 52,

59) and thereafter on Ma7 24, 1962, the
appellant Don Lewis B7an filed a Petition
protesting the propoaed aale or the 60 Jear
old hoae by the Executrix Beaaie Call 11elaon
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ended her
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that tne same vested
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POINT I.
THAT PARAGRAPH SECOND OF THE WILL
OF CHLOE R. CALL CREATES A FEE SIMPLE
TITLE IN THE CHILDREN OF TESTATRIX IF
THEY SURVIVE HER.
Paragraph Second of the Will of Chloe
R. Call reads:
remainder

or

"All the rest, residue and

my estate, I give, devise and

bequeath to my daughter Bessie Call Niel
and to my son, Orvis

w.

Call, in equal

~~

divided shares, share and share alike."

(R. 18).
All of the cases found by writer hold
that such wording creates an absolute fee
simple grant

~r

interest to the named take.

Counsel for appellant have never quoted
any authority for a different proposition

or meaning of such wording.

To mean any-

thing different than that a fee has been
created, this wording would have to be
coupled with different or additional wordSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ing which does not appear in this Will or

-5additional wording required b7 eases interpreting a life estate.

Subsequent

wo~

1ns contained 1n said Will atteapta to pre

vide what happens !! !h! event !h! ch1ldrt

!2 !!2! get

~

fee rather than to design

that the fee abould go to someone else.
The prior1tJ of interest of the testatrix

ia to provide

pr1aar1~y

for her childrea

aa tbe first takers and not for the last
f'·

•·· takers.

The property cona1at1ng of the 6l

Jear old hoae and unlaproved bu1ld1a« lot1
would be a 11ab111tJ to a llfe tenant beoauae lt would bring little or no 1nco•e
and taxes and special asseasmenta wo•ld
have to be paid.
The ease or Scho•p ••· Brown, J)S P.
2nd 847, Oregon, 1959, 1a one

or

the aaDJ

recent cases dealing with the queation of
whether a life estate is ereatel where a
clauae g1vea an interest to a aecond take
upon death

or

a f1rat taker.

The Schaap

case waa where a husband and w1te ude .,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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r e c 1p r o c a

..r 1ll s

v i I .g , ~

~ ~

~,

er

~ 1~

" 1

n

a..,

spouse first dylng w1th a :trt over \o
~hildren

as

provJa~d

was held tha'

ln the Wll s.

th 1 s wore; 1 ng

surv1 ving spouse an

~o~o u~

not impreSS 8 trust

r.I

Cl"e ..

f'f

Tt

:::! in sa.1""

e and. d.i

..-.!.fe estate for

~\.,.e

children.,
Where testator devised rlflall t.!le 1 es!.
dle and remainder of my es:.ate .. ·· suet
Ehras,.e creat~E_ ~ fee, though t>~/
of
lim1ta.tion or inheritance are adde1
P a. r k E, r ,., • ...·a. :r· ;-c e r 4 6 Ma. s s ., ( 5 Me t c " J 1 1! ~ l _,

roras

lJ!lA..ll the rest;;, res 1due and rema~:1de"'
of my e:sta te, ~ as used 1n c) wi 1 J ls nt1 .. n< "
as a "genera1, d~scriptl<.Jn or a~ 1 th.o .. Jr<lp
erty testa. t 0r had 1 ef't ln tb.e wo=~ll, .. ,, :r.<~;~e
real, persona~ or mixed, after the payment
of debts and specific le~acies.• Chapman

v.

Chic~,

16A« 407,409 81 Me,l09.

rhe ~ord •reQalnder@~ 1n the la~ a~
real es~ate, necessarily impl~es what 1s
left, and if the ent1.re estate ln fee oe
granted, there ca.z.l b.e no remalnd'er-:--J:-Is
an established principle of construct1 l
of cont1np;erJt r'em&linc~ers that an esta"'~
cannot oy -- :ieed t1e llw 1 ted. to an. oth er fH e r
a fee already granted.. Palmer "'!,. Coo}
·~2
NE 7 96 (Ill .. ) .,
We agree th9.

a:.1 r.::sta.te •rested at
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testator's death but it vested in the
children and not in Ryan.
The law favors the vesting of estates,
especiallY !h!g giTen !2 children or those
standing in like relation to the testator;
and under such circumstances it iapoaes
such a construction of the terms or a will
as will create a vested estate if possible.
Jones v. Pueblo Savings & Truat Co. 87 P
2nd 2,10) Colo. 455.
The law favors the earl7 vesting of
testaaentary gifts, and unless contrary
intention cleAr~y appears in will, interest
will be regar e as vested' rather than
contingent. Com'1. Mat. Bk. of Kansas Cit7
v. Martin, J40 P2nd 899,185 Kan. 116 (1959).
In re Collias• Estate (Cal. 1951) 2))
P2nd 554. •rt is clear that the sentence
'All the rest and residue or •Y estate •••••
I giTe, devise and bequeath unto ay nephew
••••• • standing alone, would bequeath the
property to Argirios (nephew) absolutely.•
Thus, that estate will not be limited by
subsequent words unless they indicate as
clear an intention therefor as was shown
by the words creating the estate. Words
of instruction to give one half of estate
to relatives in Greece do not impose a
legally enforceable duty or impose a trust
upon property. To impose a trust on property thus devised or bequeathed, it must
appear that the testator intended to impose
mandatory duties upon devisee. "Where the
person directed to carry out the wishes of
the testator is both executor and legatee,
the courts in construing the effect of the
language haTe refused to follow the strict
rule which iaposes a mandatory duty on the
executor and have apparently treated the
being
to hi•
his
Sponsored bywords
the S.J. Quinney as
Law Library.
Funding foraddressed
digitization provided by the Institute
of Museum in
and Library
Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-8oapae1ty as legatee• (and thus precatory).
A devise of the residue of a teatator 'S
property passes all of the property wh1eh
he .as entitled to devise or bequeath at
the t1me of his death or bequeathed by hi
will. Prusa v. Beasley (Okl. 1958) 335
1

P2nd J46.

Paragraph of will devising land to
testator's wife was clear and unambiguous
and wife took a fee simple title to land,
not a life estate, notwithstanding subsequent paragraph of will providing that 1t
was testator's will and desire that all
property devised to wife that remained
her property at time of her death should
be equally divided among thelr three
children, and wife had right to dispose
of land by will. (Okla. 1958) Shippy v.
Elliott 327 P2nd 645.
"I give, devise and bequeath to my
wife, Lillie Maud Fields, all the rest,
res11ue and remainder of my property"
created a fee simple title that could not
be cut down or limited to a life estate
by subsequent words that "the remainder
of my property devised and bequeathed to
her by me th~t shall be in her possession
at the time of her death shall be divided
in equal shares between my sons." Fields
v. Fields (Oreg.) J P2nd 77l. Rehearing
den1e·1 7 ?2nd '?75 and quotes 1 Underhill
on ~ills Sec. J58: "~here an absolute
gift is given in clear and expressive, or,
as sometimes expressed, 1n positive and
decisive language, the rule of construction is that the interest thus glven shall
not be taken away, cut down, limited or
diminished by subsequent vague and general
expressions. In other words, any subseexpression
of provided
intention
of andthe
Sponsored quent
by the S.J. Quinney
Law Library. Funding for digitization
by the Institute of Museum
Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-~-

testator must, in order to limit the prior
gift, be equally clear and intelligible,
and indicate an intention to that effect
with reasonable certainty."
POINT II.
THAT IF SAID

~ILL SUBSE~UENTLY

ATTEMPTS

TO CREATE A LESSER ESTATE IN THE FIRST
TAKERS, SUCH LESSER ESTATE IS REPUGNANT
TO THE FEE ESTATE FIRST CREATED.
The children of testatrix were the
primary beneficiaries of said will and
subsequent language in the will was intended
to prevent a lapse in the event a fee did
not vest in said children.

Any interpre-

tation of subsequent language that cuts
down the absolute grant to the children
in Paragraph Second of the will is repugnant to the interest stated to the children
as first takers.
To point out the repugnancy contained
in the will of Chloe Call, let us consider
the wording of the Paragraph Fifth which
purportedly grants to Don Lewis Ryan a fee
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

reversion subject to life estates of Bessie

=10-

Call Nielson and Orvis

~.

Call, to-wit:

"I direct that upon the death of my daughter Bessie Call Nielson and upon the death
of my son Orvis

w.

Call, that the shares

herein devised to them, shall go to my
nephew Don Lewis Ryan of Heber, Utah."
Now did Testatrix mean that all of the
shares given to the children should go
to Ryan?

Obviously not, because that would

mean that she gave nothing to the children.
Then what part of the children's share
did she intend go to Ryan--only that which
they did not use in their lifetimes?

The

Testatrix does not say this anywhere in
the will nor does she ever mention that
the children shall have only the income
and cannot invade the corpus.
A literal application leaves nothing
to the children because all of their shares
devised by the will to them would go to
Ryan, even their share of the property
constituting income from their alleged
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-lllife interests.

The will never mentions

a life estate, income vs. corpus, unused
portions, unconsumed principal, trust or
any other legal divisions or controls necessary to determine how much the children
get and how much that Ryan is to get.
There ls not, therefore, any logical basis
to divide the estate between the children
and ayan.

This is why the wording giving

all of the estate to the children and the
wording

giving~

of the children's share

under the will to Ryan is repugnant or
directly contrary.
The voluminous annotation on this doctrine of repugnancy without exception supports the interpretation that in wording
similar to the Chloe H. Call will a fee
is created in the first takers (children)
and that subsequent language repugnant to
such fee is void and ineffectual.
2nd l-227.

17 ALh

On pages 72 and 87 of said

annotation appears the following:

"The

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-~2-

rule prevailing in nearly all jurisdictions
is that where the bequest, devise, or gran
is sufficient in its terms to carry the f
or if personalty the analogous interest,
and is construed to have that effect, a
purported limitation over of property remaining undisposed of, or all of the property if undisposed of, is wholly void.
The more usual ground of such holding,
sometimes found joined or blended with
others, 1s that the limitation over is repugnant to the estate of the first taker.
Where the language of the bequest,
devise, or grant to the first taker includes words or inheritance or perpetuity,
or is by its express terms absolute or in
fee, the cases are, 1n general, strongly
inclined to construe the instrument as
vesting in such taker the fee or analogous
interest, and to reject the life estate
construction, and accordingly to hold the
limitation over of property not disposed
of void by virtue of the commonly prevailing doctrine concerning executory limitations of that sort.
Very recent cases continue to bear
out this doctrine:
"'N'hen an estate ln an absolute fee
ls given in one clause or will, the interest which the devisee there obtains cannot
be taken away or diminished by any subsequent or general expressions of doubtful
import, or by any inference deducible
therefrom that may be repugnant to the
estate given." Schornp v. Brown, supra.
In re Schira•s Will: A fee, once
given, cannot be cut down, by other provisions of the will, and remainder cannot
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
be engrafted
upon
a fee.
InLibrary.case of a
Library Services and Technology
Act, administered
by the Utah State
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

conflict between testator's intention and
settled rules of law, the latter must prevail. Where a will has two possible interpretations, that which complies with
the law will be preferred to that which
violates the law. ~here a fee is clearly
given, a limitation over of the remainder
is vold as inconsistent with the fee
granted, whether the gift over is expressed
to be of what remains, or may be left or
the residue or is on death of the first
taker without having disposed of the property. An attempt to dispose of remainder
of the estate the first legatee or devisee
chose to leave is, in effect, attempting
to meke a will for the first devisee, to
take effect in case the first devisee falls
to make one for himself or otherwise dispose of the property--this the testator
cannot do. If it is found that one clause,
standing alone, clearly evinces a purpose
to create a certain interest, and the subsequent language merely operates to create
a doubt about the testator's intent in
that particular, the latter words will be
disregarded. In re Schira•s Will, 165 NE
2nd 60, Ohio 1959.
Clarkson v. Bliley, (Va.) 38 SE 2nd
22, 171 ALR 1308, holds "an estate in fee
to wife of residue of testator's property
is not cut down to a life estate by a subsequent clause where testator attempted,
upon deatn of the wife, to dispose of the
property to his wtfe's nephew, the attempted limitation over being void for repugnancy."
PO I NT I I ;_.
l'!-iAT THE PHOPERTY OF THE
';I)

::~,::)TATE

3HOULC

'rO T'-JE NEPHE'...J DON LEWI.3 RYAN ONlY IN rJ;E
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c1ENT BOTH CHILDREN JF TESTATR X DIED
B~FORE

SAID TESTATRIX.

rhe Will of Chloe Call is not unusual
in its general form.
~ill

The meaning of the

fits the general pattern of simple

wills if the children are considered the
primary objects of Testatrix' bounty.

The

secret of the conflict between opposite
advocates claiming under this Nill is the
omission by the

~ill

of a time or event in

which the interest of Don Lewis Ryan attaches
The literal wording saJ'S "upon the death"
of both the children that Ryan gets "the
shares herein devised to them."

Now the

Testatrix could not have meant that literally because the children would then be
mere holders or conduits to take the estate
t~

the nephew.

It is much more reasonable

to understand that the TPstatrlx meant that
th~

nephew was to have the shares devised

to the 0hildren if both the children predeceased her.

This is the more reasonable
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-5when considered in light of the preTioua
paragraph that the surTiT1ng child was to
take the interest of a deceased child as
is usually proTided in a will.

If Para-

graph Fifth had said upon death of both
children •before I die• that the shares
of children would then go to Ryan, the
whole controTersy here would be eliminated.
It is not surprising therefore to find that
this is the law of willa and the general
rule is that where no time is fixed ror
the vesting of an estate contingent upon
the death of the first takers, that Testator contemplated that deaths g! first
occur w1th1n Tostator•e ll£!-

takere

~

!1!!·

There ia no question but that the

children are the first takers or all 2!
~

estate and that Ryan's interest is

contingent upon the deaths
children.

or

both such

If it is assumed that by Para-

graph Fifth that Testatrix meant that Ryan
would get the whole estate devised to the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-lbchildren as the will is alleged to state,
she could only have meant that Ryan were
to get the whole estate if the children
both died before Testatrix.
The case of Dawson v. McKee, 116 NE
2nd 5J8, Indiana 1954, handled this problem where contingent beneficiaries claimed
that first takers took a life estate where
will provided for contingent beneficiaries
if first takers died under certain conditions as against claim of grandchildren
that they took a vested fee upon death of
Testator.

The question was whether grand-

children took a fee title to property where
they survived the Testator or whether they
took a life interest that would descend to
survivor or descendants of one or other or
a nephew of 'restator.

Held, when the

grandchildren survived Testator, property
vested absolutely in fee in them.

The

death mentioned by the Will meant and referred to death of grandchild or both
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occurr1ng

befo,r~ de~th

o( Testator, and

a1 adverse claimant had burden

or

)roo~

of proving Testator meant otherwise.
"!/here will giving a~i-1 propef'ty ~
named grandchildren provided that (l) tf
e1 thgr s 1ou i_d die w1 thout children or
nair descendan~s surviving, his snare
snould go to survivor of the grandchildren,
(c.' 4 f both should die wlthout surviv rs.,
l:nas sho1 d go to a nephew, and (3) if
e1th~r grandchild should die with c~tld
surv~ving his share should go to such
child, but testator dtd not clearly ~~x
a time for occurrence of death of first
takers affecting such prov~ sions, ~~~_ra.l
rule would be a.12:e1 ~ed 1l ~nere.Qx .9.-~~-th 1~~
testator's lifetime would be deemed con·
templated, and hence fee -·s7ffiple vest~" n
named grandchildren when they Sl, rv 1ved
testator."
~one seeking to avoid applic~tion of
general rule of construct1on, wh~reby devise conditioned on death of flrrc taker
would be deemed to oon~~mplate d~ath during testator's l1f~.:!t1i.De, had b·.ll'den of
prov 1ng ~ def 1-r~_l te ~~ cert3.1!1 ·ctme contemplated for such death."

Another ca. s e set t; 1ng c u l~ the generAl
rnle ts Nickerson v. noove'... , 1919, 115 NE

588:
"The law fav~rs the ~esting of estates
at the ea!'liest possible .uoment and a will
should he cons t rued 8 ceo : i i ng l y 1 n the e t -~
sence ~f a clear men1feE~at1~n of the lntentlon of the tes~~t0r to the contraryo
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It is also well settled that where
real estate is devised in terms denoting
an intention that the primary devisee
shall take a fee on the death of the
testator, coupled with a devise over in
case of death of such primary devisee
without children or issue, the condition
refers to a death without children or
issue within the lifetime of the testator,
and that, if the primary devisee survives
the testator, he takes at the latter's
death an estate in fee simple."
Such a death provision with carry
over to another is a lapse provision only
and not intended to create a life estate
in first taker as the rights of parties
must be determined upon death of testator.
See In re Young's Estate, (Cal. 19)1} 1

P 2nd 523.
"Where there is devise to one person
in fee and in case of his death to another,
contingency referred to is death of firstnamed devisee during testator's ~·"
Where testatrix devised property to
her four named children and directed
"either of them dieing, their share goes
to the surviving above-mentioned children"
the words "either or them dieing" mean
death of any one of the devisees before
death of testatrix and will could not be
construed as giving testatrix's children
a life estate only. Lewis v. McConchie,
100 P 2nd 752, 151 Kan. 778.
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Construction giving estate of inheritance to first deYisee is favored, and
such estate cannot be reduced to life
estate only by unambiguous proYiaiona.
Will provided if testatrix's daughter died
without issue, property would go to others.
Court held this meant if ahe died without
issue before testatrix. "To hold that it
means death at any tiae would place a
higher value on uncertainty than upon certainty as a goal in interpretatioD." Smith
Y. Wood (Cal.) 20 P 2nd 48.
Where testator made an unequivocal
devise to the wife of the house as well
as other property and then stated that the
house at the wife's death should go to
another, will was construed to proTide a
bequest or all of the testator's property
to the surYiving widow and the second clause
was properly disregarded aa qualifying the
clear and unambiguous provision or the
first clause. In re Gormley's Eatate, JJ8
P 2nd 457 (Calif. 1959).

POINT IV.
THAT SAID WILL GIVES THE PROPERTY OF
THE ESTATE TO THE CHILDREN AT THE LAST CP
SAID WILL AS WELL AS AT THE FIRST

0~

SAID

WILL.
Paragraph Seventh of said will gives
the children or testatrix power to conYert
the whole property of the estate by sale
before the estate is closed and the proceeds
thereof 1nvea.ted in American Telephone and
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Telegraph Company stock in the names of
said children in equal shares, share and
share alike.

This provision amounts to

an absolute power of disposition in the

children.

It gives the stock to the

children, not the Executors.

Formerly,

objections were sometimes raised that the
power of sale was inconsistent with a
fee, but the later eases above cited 1n
1? ALR 2nd ?2 hold that such an absolute
power of disposition 1s consistent with
a fee and is only another way

or

saying

that the first taker is to haTe the full
benefits of the property deTised and that
the power of disposition is an incident
of the fee.
Words and Phrases defines the meaning
of "in equal shares• and "share and share

alike" by quoting the following case:
Words "in equal shares" or "share
and share alike," used in testamentary gift
of remainder to named children, import an
absolute gift. In re Wilkin's Will, 2?8
N.Y.S. 891 155 Misc. 152.
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Even if you assume that

thl~.

will

does not clearly create a tee in the first
takers (children) the last mentioned

powe~

of disposition in the children under Paragraph SeTenth is held to be enough authority
to convert a general or indef1n1te gift
into a fee, to-wit:

33 Am. Jur. 498, Section 36, Life
Estate and Remainders, •It is a well-settled
rule, firmly supported by a great numerical
preponderance of the authorities, that where
there is a devise or bequest to one in gen~
eral terms only, expressing neither fee
nor life estate, and there is a subsequent
11m1tat1on over of what remains at the first
taker's death, 1f there is also given to
the first taker an unlimited and unrestricted
power of absolute disposal, express or 1mplied, the devise or bequest to the first
taker is construed to pass a feeo The
attempted 11m1tat1on over, following a gift
whlch 1s in fee with full power of d1sposlt1on and alienation, is void. Most or the
cases arriving at th1a conclusion are baaed
upon the reasoning that the well-settled
rule that a general or indefinite giftp
coupled with an absolute or unlimited power
or disposition, passes a fee applies with
full force and effect even though the will
purports to make a gift over of whatever
may remain at the death of the devl.see, the
purported gift over merely being an invalid
repugnancy.
The Utah statute,

Sec~

74-2-5, UCA
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1953, states:

~All

the parts of a w111

are to be construed in relation to each
other, and, 1.f possible, so as to form one
consistent whole; but where several parts
are absolutely irreconcilable, the later
must prevail."
In view of this statute the will shows
that the first and last sentiments of the
testatrix were to provide absolutely for
her children if they survived her.

The

last gift also gives the property or the
estate to both children

~n

equal undivided

shares, share and share alike" and the
only provision of the will following is
to appoint said children as Executors of
the will to serve without bond.
Counsel for appellant mention on page

7 of their brief that the son, Orvis W.
Call, needed protection from "known financial irresponsibility."

It is true that

the son had not been as wise and frugal
as the daughter, Bessie Call Nielson, had
been, and this 1s perhaps the reason that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1f the property were held 1n undivided
shares by the children that 0rY18 would
undoubtedly consult with h1a aister Bessie
before encumbering or diapoa1ng or his
share of the property.

However, 1n both

instances Paragraphs Second aDd SeYenth
of the will grant the

p~opertJ

to the

children outright and absolutely.
POIKT V.
THAT A LIPE ESTATI IS JOT STATIO Bl
THE WILL AND THE POWER OF DISPOSITION OF
THE PROPERTY GIVEN TO SAID CHILDREN DOES
MOT CREATE AN •EXBCUTOBI LIMITATION OVER•
TO THE NEPHEW DOH LEWIS BlAN.
How eaa11J testatrix could haYe
stated a life eatate to her ch114ren instead of •all the rest, residue and reaainder.•

The will nowhere

••1•

life

interest and the only place 1t mentions
a •remainder• 11 in Paragraph Second where
the grant 1a to the ch1ldrea.

The life

estate ra1aea onlJ oy inference and •uat
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therefore fall.
"Every devise of land 1n any will
conveys all the estate of the devisor
therein Which he could lawfullJ devise,
unless 1t clearly appears by the will
that he intended to convey a less estate."
Section 74-1-)6, UCA 195). See also ?4-2-6,
UCA 1953, stating that a clear and d1etinct
gift prevails oYer inference from other
parts of will.
The authorities cited on Pages lJ and
14 of appellant's brief simply do not fit

the conditions stated in this will and
counsel for appellant have still failed
to apply as authority a single apec1f1c
ease to the questions railed by the Chloe
R. Call will.

We recommend a careful read-

ing of the sections in JJ Am. Jur.; Life
Estates, Remain.ders, etc. See. 19-41, and
it will be found that the principles stated
support respondent's contentions instead
of appellant•se

No case similar to this

will holds that a fee 1s not granted by
wording as contained in Paragraph Second.
Any cases purporting to find a life estate

instead of a fee are almost without
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exception cases where

1h! will attempts

to create a "limitation over• to a second
taker by employing words giving to such
second taker "whatever remains•, •property
undisposed

or•, •unconsumed portion", "what

is left", •not used for support•, •residue•
and so forth.

There is no such language

in the Chloe R. C&ll will.
portion: would remain .!!!

Such •unused

1:!.21

in hands of

first taker at time of death of such first
taker.

This is a •ree• on a "fee• situa-

tion which the older cases would not allow
but that are now allowed to operate on the
unused balance of property which the first
taker does not use du.r1ng his lifetime and
thus may be carried over to the second
taker.

Appellant does not w1sh this doctrine

of executory-limitation-over employed in
this case however as the eases hold that
the first taker may exhaust the property
and convert the assets during the life of
the first taker and the second taker then
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has no estate or expectancy.

This puts

the second taker ln the category of a
third-party beneficiary who may be dispossessed before realizing any estate.
No, the appellant Ryan ls asking for a
strict life estate and that the whole
assets of the estate be preserYed for him
and that the children haYe no r1ght to invade the eorpus or expend the pr1nc1palo
The appellant also expects a constructive
trust to be applied to preserve the estate
assets for him whether ln the form of real
estate or the Telephone Company stock.

If

the l1m1tat1on-over theory applies (and we
do not think 1 t

~ioes

for the reason stated

that the will says nothing about •property
remaining or unconsumed") then the children
would have the right to use the property
"as they see fit" under the cases.
There ls a difference of opinion yet
today as to whether the 11mltat1on-over
theory 1s applicable at all in a caae w
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-~7-

a fee is first stated in the will, as
commented in 17 ALB 2nd )6 and

102~

to-wit:

The general proposition supported by
many cases is that where the first taker
11 given, either expressly or bJ implication, what 1a commonly designated as "the
absolute power of d1spos1t1on,• and the
terms of the devise, bequest, or conveyance to him are approp~1ate to carry the
fee, or if personalty the analogous interest, he takes the property absolutelJ
and an attempted 11m1tat1on over of anything remaining undisposed of, or of the
whole property if undisposed of, 1s void.
The rule has been applied without regard
to whether or not the limitation 11 conditioned on any further event such as death
of the first taker without issue surviving.
However no case 1apoaea a strict life
estate upon property given to first taker
where a fee is stated to first taker, unless it is spec1f1oallx •entioned 1n the
will as a life usage.
See JJ Am. Jur., Life Estates, etc.
Sections 29, )6, 37, J8, and 17 ALB 2nd
1-227.

POINT VI.
THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S INTERPRETATION
OF THE WILL IS CONSISTENT WITH THE WHOLE
~ILL.
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The w111 vf Ch: oe B
surv1 v 1.n~

cr

Call

(1 ,res

he

1.1 ir en lt.Oe who, e ~st::J te 1n

both Paragreoh 34 "one and Seven",n

no 11m1 "'at:. on to anyone e1 e e1
or 1mplted in said

~.1

w1. tn

'r • xi

There

Paragraph~.

1

1S

life tenancy mentioned, n0 ,:ons;l"'tlctllue
trust, no remainder to

o1;!'i ur .. ,

no "tlnex

pended portions" to go to other parties
The .,111 speaks as of testa trlx • c.ea .-;n

and vests 1n the li y·!.ng

ohl,.d:~er:

a fE oo,

The will makes no distinction between the
corpus of the estate or principal

thEre~

as contrasted with income or profits
thereof.

To interpret strictly or liter-

ally all the shares devtsed by the wtJ
to the children goes t) the nephew Ryan,

but this would fly in the face of the
Janguage giving the chlldren equal shares
of

~

the Ero2ertl 1n the first and last

gifts of the wlll.

The court would h6ve

to find a constructive trust on the te ephone stock 1n the names of the children
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

...

no

-29share and share alike to prevent the
children from disposing of the property
nephew Ryan in expectancy.

This strict

interpretation as appJied to this will
would impose a burden on the children
rather than a benefit and would be contrary to the expressed intention of the
will to give absolutely to the children
all of the estate in equal shares, share
and share alike.

It would have been

better to give the estate outright to Ryan
as testatrix knew the property had little
or no income value.

Testatrix also knew

her son was a building contractor who commenced building homes on the property during her occupancy and testatrix in fact
deeded all the estate to her children before she died (See StatP,ment of

~acts)

but

said children recorded deeds back to their
mother while she lay on her deathbed in
the hospital.
The will should logically be inter-
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-)Dpreted as follows:
First, that the Testatrix conveyed
all of the property to her ch1Jd~en in
equa • undivided shares, share and share
alike.
Second, that all of the property
should go to the daughter, Bessie Call
Nielson, tn the event she should survive
the Testatrix and Orvis w. Call.

Th1 rd, that all of the property sho1 .ld
go to the son, Orvis W. Call 1n ths event
he should survive both the Testat~lx and
Bessie Call Nielson.
Fourth, that in the event both of
said children died before Testatrix, that
the property of the estate should go to
the nephew, Don Lewis Ryan.
Fifth, in the event that the property
does not go to the children Bessie or Orvis
and in the event the property does not go
to the nephew, Don Lewis Ryan, the property should go to William K. Ryan and
Phyllis F. Ryan Has~:1ngs, 1n equal shares,
share and share alike.
Sixth, that during administration
the children can sell the property of the
estate and place the proceeds thereof in
American Telephone Company stock in the
names of Bessie Call Nielson and Orv1s w.
Call in equal, undivided shares, shar~ and
share alike ..
It would seem that since both

surv1ved testatrix, the logical

ch1ldrer~

1nte~t1;n

would favor a vesting of a fee almpl e

~··state
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.:.Jlin the children as direct descendents of
testatrix.
CONCLUSION
We cannot find any support that the
executory-limitation-over doctrine 1s
applicable to the Call Will, but we do
find that each legal argument returns to
the conclusion that a fee was given by
testatrix to the children and that Ryan
was mentioned and intended to get the
estate if a lapse occurred caused by the
deaths of the children before the testa-

We have cited ample authority and

tr1x.

uncontroverted cases for thls proposition.
The judgment of the lower court should
be affirmed g.1v1ng the children a fee simple
title.
Respectfully submitted,

MORGAN AND PAYNE
128 East Center Street
Provo, Utah

J. Rulon Morgan and
Dean w. Payne
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